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Criminal Law
by Bernadette C. Crucilla"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In this year's criminal law survey, I have taken a cue from my
colleagues of past years and included only the most significant cases and
statutory amendments.1 A body of law born from resolving the inherent
conflicts between prosecutors and defenders is necessarily in a constant
state of change. It is, therefore, impossible to comment on every
development within a specific time period. To that end, this Survey
limits the discussion to those legal developments with the widest
application to Georgia criminal law practitioners for the time period
from June 1, 2013 through May 31, 2014.

II. STATUTORY CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM
This survey period is significant for one of the most expansive
statutory overhauls in the criminal justice system in decades. 2 In what
is arguably Governor Nathan Deal's most valuable gubernatorial
achievement to date, a "one-two" punch was delivered to both Georgia's
adult and juvenile justice systems via the enactment into law of House

Bills 3498 and 2424 with the assistance of the Georgia General Assembly.6 In addition, an ongoing commitment to reform was exhibited via
* Owner/Attorney at Crucilla Law Firm LLC, Macon, Georgia. University of South
Florida (B.A. 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia; Member, American Bar Association; Member,
Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, Macon Bar Association;
Member, Macon Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, National Innocence
Network (Shaken Baby Division); Master, Bootle Inn of Court.
1. For an analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see Franklin
J. Hogue, CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REv. 79 (2013).
2. See Ga. H.R. Bill 349, Reg. Sess. (2013); Ga. H.R. 242, Reg. Sess. (2013).
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 349, Reg. Sess. (2013).
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 242, Reg. Sess. (2013).
5. Ga. H.R. Bill 349; Ga. H.R. Bill 242.
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creation of the Georgia Council on Criminal Justice Reform, a board of
biennial reviews of both the
fifteen appointees tasked with conducting
6
systems.
justice
juvenile
and
adult
Statutory Reform-Adult CriminalJustice
Adult criminal legislation became effective July 1, 2013, and applies
to all criminal offenses occurring on or after that date.7 As a general
overview, more liberal appeal rights were given to the prosecution,' and
trial courts were provided sentencing options below the mandatory
minimums for trafficking in drugs,9 as well as for serious violent
felonies and sex offenses.' Provisions regarding a defendant's knowledge of the weight of the drugs they possessed were clarified."z In
addition, defendants are now permitted to retain otherwise lost driving
privileges while they are enrolled in rehabilitative programs, 2 incarcerated individuals can use Helping Outstanding Pupils Educationally3
General Education Development (HOPE GED) vouchers after release,
and more lenient options are available for expungement of criminal
records.' 4 Each category will be discussed in turn.
Rather than being limited only to the appeal of the grant of a
defendant's motion to suppress, prosecutors can now appeal any trial
court order excluding evidence. Further, a certificate of immediate
review is no longer needed in any instance.'"
The drug trafficking statutes were amended to remove the "knowingly"
requirement, which previously required prosecutors to prove that
defendants had knowledge of the weight of the controlled substance they
possessed.'" This amendment closed the gap left open by former
section 16-13-31(a)-(f) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.),' 7 which required that a person "knowingly" sell, manufacture, deliver or possess a trafficking amount of a particular drug, and

A.

6. O.C.GA §§ 17-19-1(a), -2(a), -4(a)(1) to (2), -5 (2013).

7. See Ga. H.R. Bill 349; Ga. H.R. Bill 242; see also Appeal or Certiorariby State in
Criminal Cases HB 349, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 16, 19 (2013).
8. See O.C.G.A. §§ 5-7-1 to -2 (2013); Appeal or Certiorariby State in CriminalCases
HB 349, supra note 7, at 26.
9. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2)(A),(B)(i) to (x) (Supp. 2014).
10. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(e) (2013 & Supp. 2014); O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1) (2013).
11. O.C.GA. §§ 16-13-31, -31.1 (2011 & Supp. 2014).
12. O.C.GA. § 40-5-76 (2013).
13. O.C.G.A. § 20-3-519.6 (Supp. 2014).
14. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(aX6) (Supp. 2014).
15. O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(aX5), -2(b).
16. O.C.GA. § 16-13-31(a) to (f) (Supp. 2014).
17. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) to (f) (2011).
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subsequent court interpretations of that statute.'" In addition, the
trafficking statutes now permit a judge to deviate from mandatory
minimum sentences if the judge finds certain conditions are met. 9
This discretion is not unfettered, however, because the court is limited
in how much it can deviate. 20 Although the statute continues to cap a
prison sentence at a maximum of thirty years,2 ' it does expressly
provide the court with a loophole that permits it to deviate downward
from any mandatory minimum sentences whenever the prosecutor and
the defendant agree to such deviation. 22 There are mirror provisions
for trafficking the drug ecstacy.2"
Mandatory minimum sentences for both serious violent felonies and
sexual offenses were also eviscerated, permitting the court to depart
downward whenever the prosecutor and the defense agree.2 4 The prior
rules prohibiting parole and early release remain relatively untouched;
however, defendants are now permitted early release to participate in a
transitional center or work-release program during their final year of
incarceration.25
Other notable provisions include availability of HOPE GED vouchers
to incarcerated people within twenty-four months of release.2" Practitioners should also note additional lenient expansions to expungement

18. See O.C.G-A. § 16-13-31(a) to (f) (Supp. 2014); O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(a) to (f) (2011);
see also Scott v. State, 295 Ga. 39, 42, 757 S.E.2d 106, 107 (2014) (holding that in cases
prosecuted under the prior version of the statute, the State must prove the defendant knew
the amount of drugs he possessed due to the express inclusion of the word "knowingly").
19. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2)(A)(i) to (v). The court can deviate from the mandatory
minimum sentences if it finds (1) the defendant was not a leader; (2) the defendant did not
use a weapon; (3) the conduct did not result in death or serious bodily injury to a victim;
(4) the defendant has no prior felony convictions; and (5) the interest of justice will be
served by the deviation downward. Id.
20. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(gX2)(B)(i) to (x).. The ranges are from two years and six
months of prison time (plus a monetary fine) to twenty-five years of prison time (plus a
monetary fine), all dependent upon the quantity of drugs. Id.
21. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(h).
22. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(gX2XDX3). This appears to be notwithstanding any other
findings or lack of findings by the court. See id. For example, if it were not the
defendant's first felony (thereby precluding a deviation under subsection (g)(2)(A)), the
court could still deviate downward if the state and defendant agreed upon a particular
sentence. See id.
23. O.C.GA. § 16-13-31.1.
24. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-10-6.1(e), -6.2(c)(1). However, in the case of sexual offenses, if the
prosecution and the defense cannot agree to a downward deviation, the court may still
depart from the mandatory minimum sentences if it finds certain statutory requirements
are met. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.2(c)(1)(A)-(F).
25. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31.1(e); O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1(f) (2013 & Supp. 2014).
26. O.C.GA § 20-3-519.6.
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rules.27 The statute further allows defendants to retain otherwise lost
driving privileges while enrolled in rehabilitative programs.2 8
The adult criminal code amendments are arguably pro-defendant.29
The amendments illustrate an overall trend in Georgia away from strict
mandatory minimum sentencing and toward a more balanced approach
that expressly encourages cooperation and agreement between prosecutors and defendants, as well as offender rehabilitation." It is hopeful
these revisions will have a positive effect on Georgia's racially disproportionate and overcrowded prison population. 1
B.

Statutory Juvenile Justice Reform

House Bill 242 (the Act) rounds out the Governor's criminal justice
reform with a focus on the juvenile code. 2 Juvenile justice reform was
a process that began in 2004 with work by, among others, the Georgia
State Bar's Young Lawyer's Division and JUSTGeorgia, a statewide
juvenile justice coalition, which eventually completed a model juvenile
justice code.'
In 2012, Governor Deal issued an executive order
reassembling the Special Council on Criminal Justice Reform to continue
its recommendations to the legislature,3 and through House Bill 242,
the code was ultimately amended during the 2013 session. 5
The largest portion of the Act amends Title 15 of the Juvenile Code.36
These new provisions took effect on January 1, 2014 and apply to all
offenses and juvenile proceedings that occur on or after that date. 7

27. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37 (2012 & Supp. 2014). A misdemeanor may now be expunged if
originating from a felony precursor if the misdemeanor is not a lesser included offense.
O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(jX1). Expungement is also automatic for any offense if the prosecutor
does not respond to an expungement request within 90 days. O.C.G.A. § 35-3-37(n)(2).
Further, if the prosecutor objects to a request, they must state their reasons with
specificity and attach evidence in support thereof. Id.
28. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-76. Driving privileges may be retained while the defendant is
enrolled in drug court or mental health court. Id.
29. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
31. See generally GA. SUPREME COURT COMM'N ON RACIAL AND ETHNIC BIAS IN THE
COUERT SYSTEM, Let Justice Be Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially, 12 GA. ST. U. L.

REV. 687 (1996).
32. Ga. H.B. 242.
33. See Jason Carruthers & Jessica Sully, Juvenile Justice Reform HB 242, 30 GA. ST.
U. L. REV 62, 68-69 (2013).
34. 2012 Executive Orders,OFFICE OFTHE GOVERNOR (May 24,2012), http://gov.georgia.
gov/2012-executive-orders.
35. See Ga. H.B. 242.
36. Id.
37. Ga. H.B. 242.
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The first portion of the Act outlines the legislative policy behind the
reform. 8 This includes protection of the community, accountability for
violations of law, treatment and rehabilitation for the juvenile offender,
and guarantees of due process of law. 9 These principles are recurrent
throughout the statutory scheme.
Highlights of the Act include a new and comprehensive seventy-six
item definition section, and the creation of an entirely new designation
of juvenile as a child in need of services (CHINS).4 ° The least restrictive custody possible for a CHINS is favored, and any detention ordered
must be extremely limited and temporary in nature.4
A new two-tiered class of designated felonies (Class A and Class B)
was also created.42 This two-tiered classification provides adjustment
of penalties based on the severity of the offense and limits sentencing for
the less severe offenses to no more than eighteen months in confinement.43 For example, for Class A felonies, a maximum of sixty months
in confinement, followed by twelve months of intensive supervision, is
mandated."" For Class B felonies, confinement must be for a maximum
term of eighteen months, followed by six months of supervision.4 5 In
all circumstances, the court must be guided by the policy that the least
restrictive facility is always favored.4 Further, the court must consider
certain factors before ordering restrictive custody for any child adjudicated of committing a Class A or B felony, including: the child's age and
maturity; the child's needs and best interests, record, background, and
risk level; the nature of the offense; the community needs; and the
victim's characteristics.4

38. Id.
39. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-1 (2014).
40. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(11) (2014). CHINS is a new designation that replaces the
previous designation of "unruly child." See O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(2) (2012). It is a child "in
need of care, guidance, counseling, structure, supervision, treatment, or rehabilitation and
who is adjudicated to be . .. [h]abitually disobedient" or a status offender, that is, an
offender who commits an act that would not be against the law if committed by an adult,
such as skipping school or running away. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(11)(A)(1)-(vii) (2014).
41. See O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-410 to -413, -601(a) (2014).
42. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-2(12) to (13) (2014).
43. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(c) to (d) (2014).
44. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(c). In addition, the time must be served at a Youth Detention
Center (YDC). O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(f)(2)(A) (2014).
45. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(d). For Class B felonies, there is flexibility in placement
depending upon a designated risk level. Id. Medium- and high-risk juveniles must serve
half of their disposition at a youth detention center, and low-risk juveniles may be
sentenced to a non-secure residential facility. Id.
46. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a).
47. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(b) (2014).
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The delinquency provisions of the code were also completely revamped,
paying particular attention to due process considerations." Included
are requirements regarding the parties to a proceeding, 49 a limited
right to waive representation by an attorney,50 and new provisions
mandating the appointment of a guardian ad litem. 51 New procedural
guidelines include the use of a detention assessment to determine if a
child must be detained prior to adjudication,52 the procedures for intake
4
and arraignment," and the procedures for service and discovery.'
There are likewise new guidelines regarding the transfer of juvenile
cases to superior court.55 Although former rules regarding exclusive
and concurrent jurisdiction of superior and juvenile courts are retained,
5
when making optional transfers, the court must consider new criteria. "
Further, when a transfer order is issued, it is now immediately
appealable by the juvenile.57
In addition, once a child is adjudicated delinquent, the Act provides
new guidelines for disposition.5" For example, if directed by the court,
a probation officer or other designee must prepare a written report to
assist the court in determining the proper disposition, including the aeed
for rehabilitation, and it must include the results of any ordered
exams.59 Further, as required throughout the Code, the court is
instructed to make the least restrictive disposition order appropriate in
view of the seriousness of the delinquent act, the child's culpability, the
60
child's age, the child's prior record, and the child's specific needs. All

48. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-470(2) (2014). The stated aim is to balance holding children
accountable for their actions with efforts to mitigate adult consequences of criminal
behavior, rehabilitate delinquent children through community-based programs, and
successfully reintegrate the children to their homes and communities. O.C.G.A. § 15-11470(1) (2014).
49. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-473 to -474 (2014).
50. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-475 (2014).
51. O.C.GA. § 15-11-476 (2014). A guardian ad litem must be appointed if the parent

cannot protect the child's best interest or if the parent fails to accompany the child to court.
Id.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
Id.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

§ 15-11-505 (2014).
§ 15-11-510 (2014).
§§ 15-11-530 to -532, -540 to -546 (2014).
§ 15-11-562 (2014).
§ 15-11-564 (2014).
§§ 15-11-590 to -608 (2014).
§ 15-11-590(a)-(d).
§ 15-11-601(a).
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disposition orders must be tailored to the particular child's treatment,
rehabilitation, and welfare. 6'
In addition to the new statutory maximum confinement provisions for
designated Class A or B felonies, the Act includes new disposition
provisions. For example, the court may not order a child adjudicated of
a misdemeanor act to be placed in an "institution, camp, or other
facility" unless the child has been previously adjudicated for a felony
offense and has at least three prior adjudications for specific delinquent
acts.62 Another important change to the disposition rules is that a
child may move for early release from restrictive custody at any time
and may renew said motion within six months.63
Consistent with the adult criminal justice reform during the survey
period, the new laws are pro-juvenile." The laws further illustrate a
new trend of providing the least restrictive custody possible with an eye
towards rehabilitation and treatment, as well as returning the juvenile
home and to the community as quickly as possible. 5 It is hoped this
trend will not only reduce juvenile recidivism, but will serve to chill
juvenile offenders from entering the adult system and becoming
recidivists there.66 Due to the extensiveness of the statutory overhaul,
it is recommended that practitioners of juvenile law take the time to
carefully analyze Title 15 in its entirety.
III.

CASE LAW CHANGES

This survey period was not without activity in the state appellate
courts. Some of the important decisions are discussed below.
A.

Roadblocks
Every year, Georgia drivers see more roadblocks set by law enforcement to apprehend impaired drivers.6 7 In two separate roadblock cases
decided on the same day, the Georgia Supreme Court clarified the
appropriate analysis used in determining the constitutionality of a

61. Id.
62. O.C.G.A. § 15-11-601(a)(10)(B), (11XB).
63.

O.C.G.A. § 15-11-602(f)(2)(A).

64. See O.C.GA. § 15-11-1.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See Georgia,GOVERNORS HIGHWAY SAFETYASsN, http://www.ghsa.org/html/statein
fo/bystate/ga.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2014) (listing the frequency of Georgia sobriety
checkpoints as "Weekly").
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roadblock. 8 Review of a roadblock is now a clear and distinct two-step
analysis.69 It has long been held that a roadblock will be deemed
constitutional if five factors can be shown: (1) the decision to employ the
roadblock was made by supervisory personnel (instead of by officers in
the field); (2) all vehicles are stopped as opposed to random stops; (3) the
delay to motorists is minimal; (4) the roadblock is well identified as a
police checkpoint; and (5) the screening officer is trained and qualified
to make an initial determination as to which motorists should be given
tests for intoxication.7 ° The United States Supreme Court has also held
that any checkpoint program must have, in addition to the above
constitutional safeguards regarding implementation and operation, a
primary purpose beyond a "general interest in crime control."71
In Brown v. State,7 2 the Georgia Supreme Court conducted a thorough analysis of roadblock law, finding that over time, the requirement
that a particular roadblock be made by "supervisory personnel"-as
outlined in LaFontaine v.StateT3-became inextricably conflated with
the requirement-outlined in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond7 4 -that
a roadblock have a primary purpose other than a general interest in
crime control.75 The court reasoned the two analyses involved "different
factual inquiries" and served "different objectives."76 Thus, the court
held that the analyses must be addressed separately because it is
possible that one checkpoint could meet the Edmond requirements but
be declared unconstitutional under the LaFontaine factors.77 In fact,
that is exactly what occurred in the two cases heard on October 21,
2013.78
In Brown, a captain of the Cobb County Sheriff's Department emailed
his officers and requested they conduct traffic enforcement on Groover
Road in response to a citizen complaint. The next day, a shift supervisor
sent a corporal to survey the road. The officer reported back that the
68. Brown v. State, 293 Ga. 787, 797-98, 750 S.E.2d 148, 158 (2013); Williams v. State,
293 Ga. 883, 887, 750 S.E.2d 355, 359-60 (2013).
69. Williams, 293 Ga. at 887, 750 S.E.2d at 360.
70. LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 253, 497 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1998).
71. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,44 (2000) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648, 659 n.18 (1979)).
72. 293 Ga. 787, 750 S.E.2d 148 (2013).
73. 269 Ga. 251, 253, 497 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1998).
74. 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
75. Brown, 293 Ga. at 796-97, 750 S.E.2d at 157-58. The focus of the Edmond
requirement is on why the agency is using the roadblock, while the focus of the LaFontaine
requirement is how the program is implemented by a supervisor. Id.
76. Id. at 796, 750 S.E.2d at 157.
77. Id. at 797, 750 S.E.2d at 158.
78. Id.; Williams, 293 Ga. at 888-89, 750 S.E.2d at 360.
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road was not conducive to speed control devices because it was too curvy.
Two days later, the sergeant decided to set up a virtually spontaneous
roadblock. 7" The court went through the distinct two-part analysis and
determined that the Cobb County checkpoint policy had a primary
purpose other than general crime control. This was evident because the
policy actually specified the roadblocks were to "monitor and check
driver's licenses, driver condition, vehicle registrations, vehicle equipment, and various other requirements of the Georgia State Motor Vehicle
and Traffic Code." However, the court found evidence that the sergeant,
as an officer in the field, actually made the decision to set up the
roadblock and that he was not acting as a supervisor.8s
In Williams v. State,s" on the other hand, the court used the same
analysis, but found that the roadblock program did not have an
appropriate primary purpose other than general crime control.8 2 There,
the roadblock at issue was held in Bibb County and was instituted by
the Bibb County Sheriffs Office and the state-subsidized Highway
Enforcement of Aggressive Traffic (HEAT) Unit."3 The Bibb County
policy manual on roadblocks stated that "[viehicles may also be stopped
at general roadblocks which serve legitimate law enforcement purposes.
If evidence of a crime is observed, an officer has the right to take
reasonable investigative steps."
The supreme court held that this language authorized general
roadblocks without limitation.8"
It reasoned that legitimate law
enforcement purposes include vehicle safety and driver sobriety, but
could also include general wrongdoing and general interest in crime
control.88 Thus, although the particular checkpoint at issue may have
met constitutional muster, the supreme court held that the Edmond
analysis required a review of the "policy purpose of the checkpoints,
viewed 'at the programmatic level,' to ensure that an agency's checkpoints" were established for a proper purpose. s The checkpoint was
therefore ruled unconstitutional even though the sergeant who authorized it made the decision in advance as a supervisor.88 Thus, challenged roadblocks are subject to a separate and distinct two-part

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Brown, 293 Ga. at 803-04, 750 S.E.2d at 162.
Id. at 800, 804, 750 S.E.2d at 160, 162.
293 Ga. 883, 750 S.E.2d 355 (2013).
Id. at 893, 750 S.E.2d at 363.
Id. at 884, 750 S.E.2d at 358.
Id.
Id. at 892, 750 S.E.2d at 362.
Id.
Id. at 891, 750 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Brown, 293 Ga. at 795, 750 S.E.2d at 157).
Id. at 891, 750 S.E.2d at 361-62.
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analysis. The standards were clarified, and the factors outlined in
8
Edmond and LaFontaine can no longer be conflated. "
Burglary
Burglary has always consisted of an "unlawful" entry, but can the
entry still be unlawful if one gains consent to enter by fraudulent
practices? In State v. Newton," the Georgia Supreme Court considered
that very concept for the first time. 9' Predictably, the court held in the
affirmative. 2
An individual identifying himself as "David Flynn" retained a real
estate broker in Douglas County to assist him in relocating to Georgia
from New Jersey. Flynn signed a brokerage agreement and produced
false identification that allowed him to do so. Flynn then spent two full
days in Georgia with the broker looking at houses. While viewing a
house owned by another real estate agent (who gave permission to the
defendant and his agent to enter), a distraction resulted in the defendant
being left alone in an upstairs bedroom. Later, it was discovered that
approximately twenty-thousand dollars worth of jewelry was stolen.
Although the defendant was convicted of burglary at trial, the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, concluding the evidence was
insufficient to show the defendant had been without authority to enter
93
the house because he had the owner's consent.
Under O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1,9 as applicable at the time, "[a] person
commits the offense of burglary when, without authority and with the
intent to commit a felony or theft therein, he enters or remains within
the dwelling house of another."95 When reviewing the facts of this case,
including the fact that the defendant had obtained consent to enter by
fraud, the supreme court held there was no significant difference
between gaining entry by force or gaining consent to enter by fraud or
artifice.96 The court of appeals decision was reversed and the case was
This case illustrates the point that one
remanded for sentencing.
if one did not have it otherwise.
trickery
by
entry
lawful
gain
cannot

B.

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Brown, 293 Ga. at 799, 750 S.E.2d at 159.
294 Ga. 767, 755 S.E.2d 786 (2014).
Id. at 767, 769, 755 S.E.2d at 787-88.
Id. at 773, 755 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 767-70, 755 S.E.2d 787-88.
O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1 (2007).
Newton, 294 Ga. at 770-71, 755 S.E.2d at 789 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(a)).
Id. at 772, 775 S.E.2d at 790.
Id. at 773, 775 S.E.2d at 790.
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C.

Merger
One case during this survey period reminds practitioners to negotiate
pleas with precision while anticipating any merger issues. 98 This is
because the limited record at a plea hearing may work to waive any
later merger claims. 99 In Nazario v. State,'° the Georgia Supreme
Court granted review of the question of whether the entry of a guilty
plea automatically waives any claim that the convictions merged as a
matter of law or fact.1"'
The defendant was charged with twenty-six crimes arising out of the
beating and stabbing death of his girlfriend and the concomitant abuse
of her three children. As negotiated with the State, the defendant
pleaded guilty to seventeen of the twenty-six charges as follows: one
count of felony-murder (based on aggravated assault with a knife); two
counts of aggravated assault (one for inflicting injuries with a knife and
the other for striking the girlfriend with an object); four counts of
aggravated battery (two against his girlfriend and two against a child);
five counts of concealing a death; and five counts of child cruelty. The
trial court sentenced him to life in prison for felony murder with ten
years to serve for each concealment conviction. The court also sentenced
the defendant to serve twenty years for the aggravated assault,
aggravated battery, and child cruelty convictions, with all sentences
running concurrently.'02
The defendant filed a direct appeal asserting the following: (1) the
aggravated assault predicate conviction should have merged into the
felony murder conviction; (2) that his two child cruelty convictions for
injuring the oldest child should have merged because the injuries to that
child most likely happened at the same time; (3) the two child cruelty
convictions for leaving the two children bound and gagged were based
on the same conduct as the concealment charges and should have
merged; and (4) the five concealment convictions should have merged as
a matter of fact. 3
The State countered by relying on a list of Georgia cases holding a
guilty plea waives all merger claims.'0 4 The court held that any
conviction that merges with another is a nullity and will be vacated as

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).
Id. at 488-89, 746 S.E.2d at 116.
293 Ga. 480, 746 S.E.2d 109 (2013).
Id. at 480, 746 S.E.2d at 111.
Id. at 482-84, 746 S.E.2d at 111-12.
Id. at 490-91, 746 S.E.2d at 117-18.
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an illegal sentence even without an objection or an enumeration on
appeal.'0 5 This is true provided the issue arises during a proceeding
in which void convictions may be challenged, such as a direct apThe court cautioned, however, that because the factual record
peal.'
in a guilty plea is so limited, merger claims arising from guilty pleas will
"rarely prevail."0 7
In analyzing the case, the court held the only merger claim that had
sufficient basis in the limited guilty-plea record was the defendant's
fourth allegation-the five concealing-the-death convictions should
merge. 0 8 The court reasoned that the gravamen of that offense was a
person preventing a discovery that someone has been unlawfully
killed.'0 9 Since the record showed each separate act of hindering was
in fact part of a single course of conduct that hindered a single discovery,
the court found all five convictions should have merged." 0
Although the defendant was successful in having his five concealment
convictions merged, the rest of his merger arguments failed due to the
limited record established during the guilty plea hearing."' Thus, this
case serves to illustrate the lesson of which the court cautioned-the
importance of extreme precision during plea hearings."'
D. Re-sentencing
A system of justice that is based on notions of fundamental due
process has no place for the retribution of a vindictive judge. It is for
that reason the Georgia Supreme Court revisited the correct approach
for determining whether a new sentence triggers the presumption of
vindictiveness.113
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Id. As to the defendant's other claims, the court determined that none were

supported by the limited record from the guilty plea. Id. at 490, 746 S.E.2d at 117.

Specifically, as to claim one, it concluded the felony murder count did not cross-reference
the aggravated assault, and the aggravated assault did not necessarily cause a fatal injury;
thus, merger was not mandated. Id. As to claim two, the court found that the indictment
charged the child cruelty counts separately, and neither count alleged what specific injury
it referenced, so merger was not mandated. Id. at 490-91, 746 S.E.2d at 117-18. As to
claim three, the binding and gagging of the child (child cruelty) had different elements than
the concealment convictions; thus, those did not merge. Id. at 491, 746 S.E.2d at 118.
111. Id. at 480, 746 S.E.2d at 111.
112. See id.
113. State v. Hudson, 293 Ga. 656, 656-57, 748 S.E.2d 910, 911 (2013).
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The United States Supreme Court has long held that due process
considerations do not allow a trial court to penalize defendants for
making post-trial challenges to their convictions and sentences.'" Due
process requires, the Court has stated, that vindictiveness play "no part"
in any new sentence a defendant receives after obtaining a new trial,
and also requires that a defendant be permitted to seek post-conviction
rights without fear of retaliation."'
Thus, "vindictiveness will be
presumed whenever a more severe sentence is imposed after a retrial or
remand."" 6 To overcome this presumption of vindictiveness, the judge
must affirmatively specify the reasons justifying the increase in sentence
severity, and that increase must be based on "objective information [of]
...identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant."" 7
There have been two approaches to determine whether the vindictiveness doctrine has been triggered. First is the "count-by-count" approach,
which has been used in Georgia since 1975.118 Second is the "aggregate" approach, which the majority of state appellate courts have
adopted." 9 The count-by-count approach requires a court to consider
each count individually and to compare the initial sentence with the new
sentence on a count-by-count basis. 2 ' If the sentence for any one
count is increased for the second (new) sentence, vindictiveness is
presumed. 2 ' Under the aggregate approach, the court must compare the
total original sentence with the total new sentence to determine if it has
increased. 112
The Georgia Supreme Court re-examined its approach, determined it
was time to follow the majority trend, and adopted the aggregate
approach. 2 3 First, it reasoned that the purpose of the doctrine was to
prevent vindictiveness by the sentencing court rather than merely to
prevent a harsher sentence.2 4 The court determined the vindictiveness presumption could apply in situations where the presence of actual
vindictiveness was unlikely."2 It reasoned that the aggregate ap-
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Id. at 658, 748 S.E.2d at 912.
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proach would12be more likely to prevent such a result because it was
more precise.

6

Second, the court concluded that "the aggregate approach is more
adept at accommodating the discretion trial courts need in fashioning
just and proper sentences.""2 7 Relying on a plurality opinion by the
supreme court in Adams v. State,28 the court noted that "judges
considering multiple related counts stemming from a single course of
conduct typically craft sentences on the various counts as part of an
overall sentencing scheme.""' To that end, if the overall sentencing
scheme unravels due to elimination of some of the original sentence, the
trial courts must be given a "wide berth" in fixing a new sentence."
Georgia is now in line with the majority of states and employs the
aggregate approach to examine sentencing issues by a court after a
Although this
successful post-trial challenge by a defendant."'
it
is designed to
court,
sentencing
the
to
flexibility
more
gives
approach
flesh out unconstitutional vindictiviness."'
IV.

CONCLUSION

This was a successful year for criminal justice reform, with affirmative
moves by our legislature away from harsh mandatory minimum prison
sentences and towards rehabilitation and cooperation between the state
and the defendant. Hopefully this movement is indicative of a long-term
commitment that will ease prison overcrowding, have an equalizing
effect on our racially disproportionate prison population, and reduce
juvenile recidivism rates.
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